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It is well documented that the venture capital industry is highly volatile and that much of this
volatility is associated with shifting valuations and activity in public equity markets. This paper
examines how changes in public market signals affected venture capital investing between 1975 and
1998. We find that venture capitalists with the most industry experience increase their investments
the most when public market signals become more favorable. Their reaction to an increase is greater
than the reaction of venture capital organizations with relatively little industry experience and those
with considerable experience but in other industries. The increase in investment rates does not affect
the success of these transactions adversely to a significant extent. These findings are consistent with
the view that venture capitalists rationally respond to attractive investment opportunities signaled
by public market shifts.
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The  high  volatility  of  the  venture  capital  industry  is  well  documented.    This 
volatility manifests itself in a number of ways: the funds flowing to venture capital firms, 
the investments firms make in portfolio companies, and the financial performance of 
portfolio companies and venture capital firms. (Gompers and Lerner, 2004).  Much of 
this volatility appears to be tied to valuations in public equity markets.  An increase in 
IPO valuations leads venture capital firms to raise more funds (Gompers and Lerner, 
1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000), an effect that is particularly strong among younger venture 
capital firms (Kaplan  and Schoar, 2005).  Moreover, returns of venture capital funds 
appear to be highly correlated with the returns on the market as a whole (Cochrane, 2005; 
Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Ljundqvist and Richardson, 2003).     
Many industry observers (see, for instance, Gupta, 2000) argue that the volatility 
of the venture capital industry is a symptom of overreaction by venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs to perceived investment opportunities.  These swings result in periods in 
which too many competing companies are funded, followed by ones in which not enough 
companies  have  access  to  capital.    The  boom  of  1998-2000  provides  an  extreme 
illustration of these problems. Funding during these  years  grew dramatically—in real 
terms, the financing level in 2000 was more than 30 times the level in 1991—and was 
concentrated in two areas: Internet and telecommunication investments, which accounted 
for 39% and 17% of all venture disbursements in 1999. Considerable sums were devoted 
to supporting very similar firms—e.g., the nine dueling Internet pet food suppliers and 
the many companies that undertook the extremely capital-intensive process of building 
second  cable  networks  in  residential  communities.  Meanwhile,  many  apparently   2 
promising  areas  such  as  advanced  materials,  energy  technologies,  and  micro 
manufacturing  languished  unfunded  as  venture  capitalists  raced  to  focus  on  the  most 
visible and popular investment areas.  
This alleged overreaction may have its roots in the behavioral biases of venture 
capitalists who irrationally associate past investment successes with future investment 
opportunities.  Or it may stem from venture capitalists who feel compelled to follow the 
herd out of concern for the reputation consequences of being contrarians (Scharfstein and 
Stein,  1990)  Indeed,  in  1999,  even  private  equity  firms  with  investment  mandates  to 
invest in leveraged buyouts felt compelled to back Internet startups.  
A contrasting view is that the volatility of the venture capital industry stems not 
from  overreaction,  but  from  the  inherent  volatility  of  fundamentals.  In  this  view, 
fluctuation  in  venture  capital  investment  activity  is  simply  a  response  to  changes  in 
investment  opportunities.    There  may  be  shocks  to  the  investment  opportunities  of 
existing entrepreneurial firms, or entry by new entrepreneurs, both of which increase the 
demand for capital.   
This paper takes a step towards distinguishing between the “overreaction view” 
and the “fundamentals view” by examining the responses of different classes of venture 
investors.  We  start  with  the  observation  (and  empirically  document)  that  the  most 
experienced venture capital firms generally have the best performance (Sorensen, 2004).  
We then examine how these most successful investors respond to public market signals 
of investment opportunities.  Are they more prone to increase their investments when the 
market  heats  ups?  And,  how  well  do  they  do  on  these  investments  relative  to  less 
experienced venture capitalists?  If we find that the most experienced investors are more   3 
prone to increase their investment levels when the market heats up, this suggests that 
shifts in fundamentals are likely an important component of venture capital investing.   
This  interpretation  is  further  supported  if  there  is  also  little  degradation  in  their 
performance.    On  the  other  hand,  if  we  observe  that  the  least  experienced  venture 
capitalists are most likely to increase their investment activity during hot markets, this 
lends more credibility to the view that overreaction is a more important cause of volatility 
in the venture capital industry.   
Our empirical results indicate that investment by the most experienced venture 
capital firms—notably those with the most industry experience—are most responsive to 
public market signals of investment opportunities.  We start by showing that venture 
capital investment activity at the industry level is very sensitive to public market signals 
of industry attractiveness such as Tobin’s Q and IPO activity; a shift from the bottom to 
the top quartile in these measures increases the number of investments by more than 
20%.  This effect is driven largely by venture capital firms with the most experience 
doing deals in the industry. General experience (across all industries) has no effect on 
investment  sensitivity  to  industry  Q  and  IPO  activity,  once  we  control  for  industry 
experience.  Moreover, although the success rate for deals done in a hot market is lower 
than it is for deals done in a cold market, the difference is small.  This difference between 
hot and cold market performance is even smaller for experienced venture capital firms 
than  it  is  for  less  experienced  venture  capital  firms.    These  findings  suggest  that  an 
important  component  of  volatility  in  venture  capital  investment  activity  is  driven  by 
volatility of fundamentals.     4 
Of independent interest is our finding of the importance of industry-specific rather 
than general experience.  It points to the importance of industry-specific human capital 
and suggests that a critical part of venture capital investing is the network of industry 
contacts to identify good investment opportunities as well as the know-how to manage 
these  investments.    These  contacts  and  know-how  come  only  from  long-standing 
experience doing deals in an industry. 
  This rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the 
construction of the data and provides some basic summary statistics.  Section 3 examines 
the impact of shifts in valuations and IPO activity and the determinants of venture capital 
organization investment activity.  In that section, we also look at the determinants of 
successful investments both in terms of the investment cycle and the characteristics of the 
venture capital organizations. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Data 
A.  Constructing the Sample 
Our  data  on  venture  investments  come  from  Thomson  Venture  Economics 
(Venture Economics).  This database provides  information about both venture capital 
investors and the portfolio companies in which they invest.  We consider an observation 
to be the first record of a venture capital organization and portfolio company pair, i.e., the 
first time a venture capitalist invests in a particular company.  This approach results in a 
dataset with multiple observations for most portfolio companies since several venture 
capital  firms  typically  invest  in  a  company.  We  exclude  follow-on  investments  by  a   5 
venture capital organization in the same portfolio company since these investments may 
result from different considerations than do initial investments.   
Our analysis focuses on data covering investments from 1975 to 1998, dropping 
information  prior  to  1975  due  to  data  quality  concerns.
1    In  keeping  with  industry 
estimates of a maturation period of three to five years for venture companies, we drop 
information after 1998 so that the outcome data can be meaningfully interpreted. As a 
result, we are not studying investments made at the height of the Internet boom (1999 and 
2000) and the crash that followed.   
From 1975 to 1998, Venture Economics provides information on 2,179 venture 
capital  firms  investing  in  16,354  companies.    This  results  in  a  sample  of  42,559 
observations of unique venture capital firm – portfolio company pairs.   
 
B.  Critical Measures and Summary Statistics 
Before  we  turn  to  an  analysis  of  investment  cycles,  there  are  three  data 
construction issues we need to address.   
The first issue is how to classify venture capital industries.  Our approach is to 
assign  all  investments  into  nine  broad  industry  classes  based  on  Venture  Economics'  
classification of the industry.  The original sample of investments was classified into 69 
separate industry segments.  However, these 69 industries are too narrowly defined for 
our purposes, as they do not correspond to lines of specialization within or across venture 
capital  firms.      These  69  industries  were  thus  combined  to  arrive  at  nine  broader 
industries. The industries we construct from the narrower definitions are: Internet and 
                                                 
1Gompers and Lerner (2004) discuss the coverage and selection issues in Venture Economics data prior to 
1975.   6 
Computers,  Communications  and  Electronics,  Business  and  Industrial,  Consumer, 
Energy,  Biotech  and Healthcare, Financial Services,  Business Services,  and all other.  
While any industry classification is somewhat arbitrary, we believe that our classification 
scheme  captures  businesses  that  have  similarities  in  technology  and  management 
expertise that would make specialization in such industries meaningful.  In addition, this 
scheme  minimizes  the  subjectivity  associated  with  classifying  firms  into  narrower 
industry groupings.   
Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution across the nine broad industries. The 
first column is the number of companies in each industry.  It is no surprise that Internet 
and Computers is the largest industry with 4,679 companies.  Biotech and Healthcare, 
Communications  and  Electronics,  and  Consumer  are  the  next  largest  industries  with 
between 2,285 and 2,745 companies.  The other industries are considerably smaller.  The 
table also reports the number of observations for each industry in our sample; there are 
more observations than companies because there are multiple venture capital investors in 
most of the companies in our sample.  On average, there are 2.6 venture capital investors 
in each company.   The overall industry distribution provides some comfort that our 
industry  classification  is  meaningful.    While  there  is  variation  in  the  number  of 
observations across industries, there are enough observations in each industry to make 
our analysis feasible. 
The second challenge has to do with the measurement of perceived investment 
opportunities.    We  use  two  measures  of  perceived  investment  opportunities  in  our 
analysis, industry Q and IPO activity.  Because we do not know whether these measures   7 
overstate or understate true investment opportunities, we will refer to industry Q and IPO 
activity simply as “public market signals.”  
The measurement of Q follows the standard approach in the investment literature.  
We calculate Q as the ratio of market value of the firm to the book value of assets, where 
the market value of the firm is measured as the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity less the book value of equity.  Since we cannot observe the Q of private firms 
that constitute the pool of potential venture capital investments, we use an estimate of Q 
for public companies as a proxy.  However, in order to do so, we need to link the SIC 
codes of public companies to Venture Economics industries on which our data is based. 
Our procedure is to identify the SIC codes of all Venture Economics firms that went 
public.  Because there are multiple SIC codes associated with each of our nine industries, 
we construct Q as a weighted average of the industry Q of the public companies in those 
SIC codes, where the weights are the relative fractions of firms that went public within 
our nine industries.  Within the SIC code, Q is calculated by equally weighting all public 
companies. 
Our  second,  less  standard  measure  is  the  level  of  venture  capital-backed  IPO 
activity in an industry.    We use this measure for both theoretical and practical reasons.  
The  theoretical  rationale  is  based  on  the  observation  that  IPOs  are  by  far  the  most 
important (and profitable) means for venture capitalists to exit an investment (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2004). Thus, an increase in the number of IPOs in a particular sector may 
make investing in that sector more attractive. In addition, an increase in IPO activity may 
also attract more potential entrepreneurs into a  sector, thereby increasing the pool of 
potential investments and the likelihood that a venture capitalist will find an attractive   8 
one.    The  practical  rationale  for  using  IPO  activity  is  that  our  Q  measure  may  not 
accurately reflect the shifts in public investors’ appetite for venture capital-backed firms 
both because it uses data on mature public companies and relies on an inexact match 
between SIC codes and Venture Economics codes.  Given the strong link between IPO 
activity  and  market  valuations  (Pagano,  Panetta,  and  Zingales,  1998  and  Ritter  and 
Welch, 2002), the IPO measure may actually be a better proxy for the public market’s 
perception of the types of investments in our sample.  
Figure  1  shows  the  relationship  between  industry  venture  capital  investment 
activity and the two measures of public market signals for four of the industries in the 
sample.  In Internet and Computers, the correlation between IPOs and investment activity 
appears to be very high throughout the period.  This high correlation can also be seen in 
Q in Figure 2.  In other industries, the relationship is less pronounced. For instance, in 
both  Biotechnology  and  Healthcare  and  Energy,  the  number  of  investments  declined 
during the last half of the 1990s, even as the number of IPOs in the industry climbed. 
The final challenge is to measure the experience of the venture capital groups in 
the sample.  The second panel of Table 1 presents data on three characteristics of venture 
capital firms that we use throughout the paper. The first such characteristic, “General 
Experience,” is the total number of investments made by a venture capital firm prior to 
the time of the investment in question. The second characteristic, "Industry Experience,” 
is  constructed  similarly,  but  includes  only  investments  in  the  same  industry  as  the 
investment in question. The third characteristic, “Specialization” is the fraction of all 
previous investments that the venture capital organization made in a particular industry, 
i.e.,  this  specialization  measure  is  the  ratio  of  industry  to  general  experience.    The   9 
specialization  measure  is  not  computed  for  the  first  investment  by  each  venture 
organization. 
Panel  B  of  Table  1  presents  the  distribution  of  general  experience,  industry 
experience, and specialization measures across all venture organization-industry pairs in 
the sample.  Since many of these observations include cases where the venture capital 
firm did not invest in an industry in a particular  year, we report the sub-sample that 
includes only investors in the industry in a given year. In addition, we provide summary 
data for 1985, 1990, and 1995. 
Overall, venture capital firms made an average of 36.3 previous investments, of 
which  4.1  were  in  the  same  industry.  The  numbers  are  higher  if  one  conditions  the 
observation on the venture capital firm making an investment in the industry during the 
year. The medians of these experience measures are considerably lower, reflecting the 
skewness of the distribution. Not surprisingly, there is an increase in experience over 
time. On average, investments are made by venture capital firms with 19.75% of their 
investments in the industry of the company in which they are investing.  This suggests 
that most venture capital firms spread out their investments across industries.   
Table 2 breaks out venture capital firm characteristics by quartile, and examines 
the  relationships  among  them.    Industry  experience  and  specialization  quartiles  were 
calculated by industry, by year, so that industries with fewer investments would not be 
disproportionately sampled in lower quartiles, and that the highest experience quartiles 
would not disproportionately reflect later investments.  The first quartile represents the 
least experienced or specialized firms, while the fourth quartile measures the highest.  
Not surprisingly, venture capital firms in the higher quartiles of industry experience have   10 
made more investments overall than firms in lower quartiles of industry experience. This 
shows  up  as  well  as  a  high  correlation  between  industry  experience  and  general 
experience.    Specialization,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  highly  correlated  with  the 
experience measures; in fact, it is negatively correlated with general experience.  This 
low correlation is driven by the firms in the highest specialization quartile who make 
fewer investments than those firms who specialize less.  The pattern is probably due to 
the fact that extreme specialization limits the pool of investments from which a venture 
capital firm can choose.    
   
3.  Analysis 
A.  The Determinants of Investments 
We first focus on understanding how public market signals affect the investment 
decisions  of  venture  capitalists.    In  Section  3.B,  we  turn  to  understanding  the 
determinants of investment success.   
Table  3  presents  a  regression-based  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the 
number of investments and our public market signals.  The first column shows the results 
of regressing the logarithm of the annual number of investments in an industry on the 
lagged logarithm of the number of IPOs in the industry, including industry and year fixed 
effects.  The coefficient estimate implies that an increase in IPO activity from the bottom 
to the top quartile increases the number of investments by 22%. Likewise, the second 
column indicates that there is a strong positive relationship between industry investment 
activity and Q.  An increase from the bottom Q quartile to the top Q quartile increases 
industry investment by 22%.  The third and fourth columns of Table 3 report the results   11 
of  using  detrended  variables  in  the  regression.    For  each  industry,  we  detrend  both 
industry investments and the public market measures.  We then use the residuals in the 
regression.  Again the magnitude of the effects is large and similar across regressions, 
although the explanatory power of the IPO measure appears to be significantly greater 
than that of Q. These regressions would appear to validate the use of Q and IPO activity 
as measures of public market signals that affect venture capital investments.  
Table  4  begins  to  look  at  the  relationship  between  venture  capital  firm 
characteristics  and  investment  behavior.    In  this  table,  we  use  as  observations  each 
venture capitalist-industry pair in each year the venture organization is active, i.e., all 
years following the first observation of an organization and ceasing in the year in which 
the  organization' s  final  investment  is  observed.    We  first  present  results  using  IPO 
activity and then check for robustness using the Q measure. The results are essentially the 
same using either measure.   
The first column of Table 4 repeats the industry level regression at the venture 
organization-industry  level.    We  include  both  industry  and  year  fixed  effects.  Not 
surprisingly,  the  regression  indicates  that  venture  capital  firms  tend  to  increase  their 
investments  in  years  and  industries  in  which  IPO  activity  increases.  The  coefficient, 
which is statistically significant, implies that an increase in IPO activity from the 25
th 
percentile to the 75
th percentile boosts the venture organization’s investment activity in 
the industry by 4.9%. 
As  the  second  column  of  Table  4  indicates,  there  is  also  a  strong  positive 
relationship  between  general  experience  and  investment  activity.      The  third  column 
decomposes  experience  into  industry  experience  and  non-industry  experience.  The   12 
regression  indicates  that  what  drives  the  relationship  is  industry  experience;  prior 
investment activity outside the industry has no  appreciable relationship to investment 
activity within the industry.  The average venture capital firm in the highest quartile of 
industry experience invests 24% more in the industry than a firm in the lowest quartile of 
industry experience.   
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 add industry specialization to the regressions. In both 
regressions, it is clear that prior focus on a particular industry increases future investment 
in the industry.  The results in column 5 indicate that an organization in the top industry 
specialization quartile makes 8% more investments in that the industry than one in the 
bottom quartile.  Finally, the last two columns of Table 4 replicate the results in columns 
3 and 5 using Q rather than IPO activity as the measure of the public market. The basic 
patterns continue to hold in these regressions, and the magnitude of the effects is similar. 
The next two tables present our main results on how venture capital firms with 
different characteristics respond to changes in public valuations and activity. In this table, 
we add to the specifications in Table 4 variables that interact our public market measures 
with our measures of firm characteristics, i.e., general experience, industry experience, 
and industry specialization. Throughout our discussion of the results, when we refer to 
periods with high IPO activity we are referring to those in the top quartile of IPO activity; 
low IPO activity refers to those periods in the bottom quartile. Likewise, high general 
experience, industry experience, and specialization refers to venture capital firms in the 
top  quartile,  while  those  with  low  general  experience,  industry  experience,  and 
specialization refers to those in the bottom quartile.    13 
The first column of Table 5 indicates that the industry investment activity of more 
experienced venture  capital firms is more sensitive to  IPO  activity than it is for less 
experienced venture capital firms.   This effect is statistically significant.  It is also much 
larger in magnitude than the effect from the average firm in the sample.  At the mean of 
the other variables, highly experienced venture capital organizations invest 9.2% more 
when  IPO  activity  is  high  than  when  it  is  low.  By  contrast,  relatively  inexperienced 
venture capital firms actually invest 1.2% less at times when IPO activity is high rather 
than  low.  The  results  also  indicate  that  industry  experience  increases  the  level  of 
investment,  not  just  the  sensitivity  of  investment  to  IPO  activity.    More  industry-
experienced venture capital firms invest 11.9% more than industry-inexperienced firms 
when IPO activity is low and 22.4% more when IPO activity is high.   
While  both  industry  and  non-industry  experience  is  positively  associated  with 
greater investment sensitivity to IPO activity (columns 2 and 3 of Table 5), only industry 
experience retains its positive effect when both interaction terms are included in the same 
regression (column 4 of Table 5).  In fact, the non-industry experience interaction with 
industry IPO activity is negative in this regression.  When IPO activity is high, industry-
experienced venture capital firms invest 7.4% more than when it is low, while venture 
capital firms with experience out of the industry invest 2.0% less when IPO activity is 
high. 
The fifth and sixth columns of Table 5 look at the effect of industry specialization 
on investment behavior.  Consistent with our findings on industry experience, we find 
that more specialized venture capital firms tend to increase their industry investments by 
more than less specialized firms when IPO activity increases.  The effect, however, is   14 
small, implying an increase in investment by 5.7% for specialized firms and 3.9% for less 
specialized firms.  
Finally,  Table  5  in  the  last  two  columns,  reports  the  results  using  Q  as  an 
alternative  public  market  measure.    Those  columns  replicate  the  basic  findings  in 
columns 4 and 6 of the table.  The magnitude of the effects is similar to those estimated 
using IPO activity.  
In Table 6 we check whether our results are driven by venture capital firms that 
choose not to invest in a given industry.  Thus, we eliminate from the regressions all 
observations in which the venture capital firm made no investments in the industry in a 
given year.   All of the findings in Table 5 continue to hold although the magnitude of the 
effects is somewhat smaller.  
Collectively,  these  results  suggest  that  industry-specific  human  capital  is  an 
important channel through which experience influences the reactions of venture capital 
firms to shifts in public market signals.  Contrary to popular wisdom, it does not appear 
that the booms and busts are being driven by the investment behavior of inexperienced or 
new venture capital firms.  In fact, these results suggest that the cyclicality seen in the 
venture capital industry is driven mostly by the more successful venture firms, that is, 
those  with  the  most  experience.    Section  3.B  considers  the  question  of  whether  the 
sensitivity of more experienced firms to public market signals is a rational reaction to 
fundamentals or an overreaction.   
 
B. The Determinants of Investment Success   15 
In this section we explore whether the greater responsiveness of more experienced 
venture capital firms to public market signals is efficient.  If these experienced firms are 
able  to  ramp  up  the  number  of  investments  they  make  in  response  to  public  market 
signals, but suffer a significant degradation of performance, the investment response to 
public market signals may, in fact, be an overreaction.  In addition to the practitioner 
accounts alluded to above, there are at least two reasons to believe this might be the case.  
First, Baker, Wurgler, and Stein (2003) show that industrial firms whose investment is 
most sensitive to Q have the lowest subsequent stock returns following periods of heavy 
investment.  A similar effect might be observed among experienced venture capital firms 
whose investment is most sensitive to Q and IPO activity. Second, at the same time that 
venture capital firms are buying equity in portfolio companies, these companies are, of 
course, issuing equity.  We know from numerous studies, including Loughran and Ritter 
(1995), that when firms issue equity, their subsequent stock returns are abnormally low.   
To assess this question, we examine the performance of the companies in which 
the venture capital firms invest.  Ideally, one would have data on the actual returns on the 
firm’s  investment.    Unfortunately,  the  best  we  can  do  is  to  determine  whether  the 
investment resulted in what would appear to be a profitable exit for the venture capital 
firm.  This is most likely the case if the company went public, registered for an IPO (as of 
the date we collected the data from Venture Economics), or was acquired or merged.  
Venture Economics does not collect valuation information for all of the companies that 
were merged or acquired and it is possible that these outcomes are not as lucrative as 
those where the company exited with a public offering.  However, investments in the 
category we characterize as successes are likely to have generated higher returns that the   16 
investments those that have not  yet exited or have been characterized as bankrupt or 
defunct.   
The final column of Table 2 provides some initial indications of the patterns of 
success by venture capital firm characteristics. The tabulations suggest that investments 
made  by  venture  capital  firms  with  more  general—and  especially  more  industry-
specific—experience  are  more  successful.    The  patterns  with  specialization  are  non-
linear, but the least specialized organizations appear to be the poorest performers.  One 
consideration in the definition of specialization is that young venture capital firms are 
more likely to be in the first or fourth quartile, since the specialization measure is always 
100% if its second deal is in the same industry as its first, or 0% if its second investment 
is in a different industry. We later consider the results looking only at organizations at the 
point in time where they made more than 10 investments and achieve consistent results.  
Our interpretation of these tabulations must be cautious, of course, because of the lack of 
controls for industry and time period. 
Table 7 examines the determinants of success in a regression framework. The 
dependent  variable  here  is  a  dummy  variable,  which  takes  on  the  value  one  if  the 
company was successful before the end of 2003.
2   Each initial investment by a venture 
capital firm in a portfolio company is used as an observation.
3  In addition to the industry 
and  year controls used earlier, we also control for the stage of the company and the 
financing round at the time of the investment, since these are likely to be associated with 
                                                 
2It should be noted that while the dependent variable is binary, we continue to use an ordinary least squares 
specification.  This reflects the fact that with non-linear specifications, the sample size drops dramatically 
due to the large number of dummy variables, some of which perfectly predict certain outcomes. 
 
3In  the  first  regression,  since  no  venture  organization-specific  independent  variables  are  used,  each 
portfolio company is used as an observation.  (In this case, the round control refers to the first financing 
round  where  there  was  professional  venture  financing.)    In  all  other  regressions,  standard  errors  are 
clustered by portfolio company.     17 
the outcome.  As in our previous regressions, we exclude observations occurring after 
1998 in order for the outcomes of the investments to be meaningful. 
The first two columns of the table suggest there is a negative, but statistically 
insignificant, relationship between IPO activity and success in the sample as a whole.  
The third column of Table 7 indicates that more experienced venture capital firms are 
more likely to make successful investments.  However, the fifth column shows that the 
effect  of  experience  is  limited  to  venture  capital  firms  with  industry  experience.  
Investments made by venture capitalists with the most industry experience are 4.3% more 
likely to succeed than those made by the least experienced venture capitalists. Given a 
baseline success rate of 54%, this amounts to a significant increase in the probability of 
success. The regressions with industry specialization in columns 6 and 7 support this 
basic finding on the role of industry specialization. The last two columns replicate the 
results using Q as our measure of the public market signal.     
Table  7  makes  it  clear  that  experienced  venture  capital  firms  do  not  perform 
worse on average, as a result of being more sensitive to shifts in public market activities.  
Table 8 digs deeper by investigating whether experienced venture capital firms perform 
worse on the investments they make when IPO activity and Q are high.  The results 
indicate that just the opposite is true.  Overall, venture capital firms do somewhat worse 
on the investments they take when there is a lot of IPO activity and Q is high, although 
the estimated effect is statistically insignificant.  However, the more experienced venture 
capitalists  exhibit  less  degradation  in  their  performance  than  do  the  less  experienced 
venture capitalists.  Based on the results in Table 7 and Table 8, it would be hard to argue   18 
that the greater responsiveness of experienced venture capital firms to IPO activity and Q 
comes at the expense of performance.  
 
C.  Robustness Analyses 
This section summarizes further analyses we undertook to determine whether our 
basic findings are robust.  
Alternative Proxies for Public Market Signals. Our analysis used Q and the IPO 
activity  of  venture  capital-backed  firms  as  proxies  for  public  market  signals.    We 
expanded our IPO activity measure to include all IPOs, not just those that were venture 
capital  backed.    The  two  measures  are  highly  correlated  (0.81)  since  both  measures 
include venture-backed IPOs.  Not surprisingly, the results were not appreciably altered.   
We also considered several other market based measures, including the earnings to price 
ratio, market to book ratio and historical industry returns.  All of these measures led to 
similar results to those presented. 
  Alternative Success Measures. Our primary outcome measure codes all mergers 
and acquisitions as successes.  To validate this choice, we further researched the 3,650 
outcomes that Venture Economics recorded as mergers or acquisitions using the Factiva 
database  and  the  SDC  mergers  and  acquisitions  database,  finding  values  for  1,263 
companies.  Of the 508 merged or acquired companies for which Venture Economics had 
information  on  the  total  amount  invested  in  the  company  and  for  which  we  found 
valuation information, 431 companies (94%) had merger or acquisition values greater 
than the total amount invested in the company, with a median sale price of seven times 
the  amount  of  money  invested.    This  supports  our  thesis  that  merged  or  acquired   19 
companies  are  likely  to  have  been  high-return  investments  for  venture  capital  firms. 
However,  one  must  be  cautious  in  this  interpretation  since  we  were  unable  to  find 
information on the majority of the mergers and acquisitions, either because they were 
purchased by other private entities or purchased by public companies in deals that were 
not accompanied by a press release (perhaps because of their small size).  Making the 
highly conservative assumption that all companies whose value we could not determine 
were  not  successful,  we  then  redefined  a  successful  investment  as  one  in  which  the 
company went public, or was in registration for a public offering, or was in a merger or 
acquisition for which we were able to find a value.  The results were similar to those 
presented. 
  One Observation per Company. Since the dataset includes multiple observations 
on the same portfolio companies, each outcome reflects not only a given venture capital 
firm’s characteristics, but those of the other venture capitalists invested in the company.  
As  an  additional  robustness  check  to  the  relationship  between  experience,  industry 
experience, specialization, and success, we used a sample with one observation for each 
portfolio  company  and  the  average  levels  of  each  variable  of  the  venture  capitalists 
investing  in  the  company.    In  these  specifications,  both  industry  and  non-industry 
experience  are  positively  associated  with  success,  as  is  specialization,  although  the 
coefficient on specialization is not significantly different than zero.  In the absence of 
more information about the specific roles that each venture capital organization plays in 
the selection and development of the company, it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
from the interaction of the different venture capitalists which invested in the company.  
This is a rich topic for future research.     20 
 
4.  Conclusions 
The venture capital industry is a highly volatile one, as dramatic fluctuations in 
fundraising  and  investment  activity  over  the  past  few  years  demonstrate.  These 
fluctuations seem to be related to changes in the public market valuations and activity. 
Practitioner accounts and the academic literature suggest that it would be valuable to 
understand the impact of this volatility on the success of venture capital investments: do 
public market shifts lead venture capitalists to make poor investment choices, or rather do 
they provide valuable information to investors? We address this question by examining 
the determinants and success of investments by the venture industry as a whole, as well 
as by subclasses of firms with different levels of experience and specialization.    
We analyze over forty thousand venture capital investment decisions over the past 
two decades.  We find that the greatest response to shifts in the public markets is not by 
new or inexperienced groups, but rather by specialized organizations with considerable 
industry experience.  Not only do the investments of these organizations tend to be more 
successful in general, but there is no appreciable degradation in their performance with 
the changing conditions.   
Our  results  suggest  that  shifts  in  public  markets  provide  information,  whether 
directly to the venture investors or else to individuals who then seek venture financing. 
Not  all  venture  groups,  however,  are  able  to  take  advantage  of  this  information:  the 
critical factor appears to be human capital.
4  
                                                 
4One might have thought that overall experience would also have been an important explanation for two 
reasons.   First, the most experienced venture capital firms tend to have the greatest access to financial 
capital.  They may already have raised large funds or they may have established reputations and networks 
that enable them to raise easily additional capital. Second, firms with the most overall experience may have   21 
The  greater  investment  sensitivity  is  associated  with  industry,  but  not  non-
industry, investment experience.  Whether that effect is from greater knowledge of the 
industry or better networks that allow for recruitment of senior management, customers, 
and strategic partners needs further exploration.   
A variety of open issues remain for future research.  First, as we acknowledge 
above,  the  precise  mechanisms  behind  the  relative  performance  of  more  specialized 
organizations  remain  unclear.    For  instance,  is  it  possible  to  disentangle  the  relative 
importance of superior investment selection and ability to add value from the ability to 
persuade entrepreneurs to accept ones’ capital?  (While Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) 
present an intriguing initial look at the venture capital decision-making process, many 
open questions remain. Sorensen (2004) represents another important step in untangling 
these issues.)  Second, because we sought to examine investment outcomes, our analysis 
only extends through 1998: we do not analyze the events of 1999 and 2000.  While the 
venture capital market has seen many cycles in the past, the magnitude of the boom and 
bust  during  this  period  was  second  to  none.    Understanding  whether  the  patterns 
delineated above continued to hold during that most dramatic of cycles is an important 
question for future researchers to examine.    
                                                                                                                                                 
access to a large pool of human capital that they can redeploy across sectors. That is, one might think of 
venture  capital  firms  as  having  an  internal  labor  market  to  complement  an  internal  capital  market.  
However, our finding that industry experience is the key driver of investment activity suggests that it is not 
easy  to redeploy venture capitalists across sectors.   This  would be the case if  human capital in other 
sectors—in the case of venture capitalists within an organization that specialize in a given industry, say 
biotechnology—were unable or unwilling to shift focus to a different industry, e.g., the Internet.  This 
prediction is in line with the view that diversified firms have a difficult time redeploying capital into sectors 
with  more  investment  opportunities:  see  Scharfstein  and  Stein  (2000),  Scharfstein  (1998),  and  Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales (2000). Fulghieri and Sevilir (2004) model some of these issues in a venture capital 
context.   22 
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Figure 1: IPOs and Number of Investments for Selected Industries 
The graphs show years on the x-axis, the number of venture investments in the industry as a line calibrated on the left y-axis and the number of IPOs as bars 
calibrated on the right y-axis. 
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Figure 2: Q and Number of Investments for Selected Industries 
The graphs show years on the x-axis, the number of venture investments in the industry as a line calibrated on the left y-axis and Q as bars calibrated on the right 
y-axis. 
















































































































































Panel B: Sample Characteristics                      
      0.25  0.50  0.75    Mean  s.d.    N 
Sample                   
General experience  11  20  45    36.26  44.99    71,874 
Industry Experience  0  1  4    4.08  8.85    71,874 
Specialization    0.00%  4.88%  16.67%    11.15%  15.56%    71,874 
Investors Only                   
General experience  14  31  65.5    51.90  60.64    14,768 
Industry Experience  1  4  12    9.47  14.60    14,768 
Specialization    4.88%  15.38%  28.57%    19.75%  19.09%    14,768 
Sample                   
1985                     
General experience   10  18  38    30.16  33.40    347 
Industry Experience  0  1  3    3.20  6.42    3,111 
Specialization  0.00%  4.84%  16.67%    11.24%  15.49%    3,111 
1990                     
General experience   11  21.5  46    37.35  42.28    478 
Industry Experience  0  1  5    4.31  8.55    4,254 
Specialization  0.00%  5.56%  17.24%    11.67%  15.61%    4,254 
1995                     
General experience  11  23  56    44.12  53.97    498 
Industry Experience  0  1  5    5.13  10.59    4,398 
Specialization  0.00%  5.26%  17.65%     11.75%  16.12%     4,398 
 
Panel  A  shows  the  distribution  of  the  sample  by  industry  which  includes  16,354  unique  companies 
compiled by Venture Economics, and 42,559 unique VC- company pairs. 
 
Panel B summarizes characteristics of venture capital funds in the sample including organization–years 
only for years after which the organization has been observed making an investment, and ceasing in the 
year after which the final investment is made. It excludes observations for years before VCs has made 5 
investments  and  excludes  VCs  who  invest  in  only  one  year  of  the  sample.  It  also  shows  these 
characteristics in three selected years.  Statistics include investments from 1975 to 1998, inclusive, and 
exclude the industry category all other.  General experience is the number of investments made by the 
venture  capital  fund  previous  to  the  date  of  its  first  investment  in  the  portfolio  company.    Industry 
Experience is the number of investments made by the venture capital fund previous to the date of its first 
investment in the portfolio company in that industry.  Specialization is Industry Experience divided by 
General experience.   
 
Panel A: Sample by Industry          
Industry      Companies  Obs. 
Internet and Computers    4,679  14,785 
Communications and Electronics  2,555  8,525 
Business / Industrial    1,364  2,256 
Consumer      2,285  4,156 
Energy      573  1,137 
Biotech and Healthcare    2,745  8,780 
Financial Services    606  952 
Business Services    509  815 
All other      824  1,153 
    Total        16,354  42,559  
Table 2: Venture Capital Firm Characteristics 
Panel A: Characteristics by Quartile                               
           Number of     Number of               
           Investments    Industry Investments    Specialization       Success 
    N       Mean  S.D    Mean  S.D    Mean  S.D       Mean 
General experience Quartile                           
1    4,490       0.46  0.61    0.16  0.41    35.13%  0.4655       50.9% 
2    3,359       3.07  1.63    1.08  1.31    34.84%  1.6337       52.0% 
3    8,728       9.76  5.08    3.24  3.45    33.00%  1.3107       52.1% 
4    24,829       82.35  78.14    20.26  24.04    25.82%  0.3729       55.7% 
Industry Experience Quartile                           
1    8,092       6.84  15.08    0.00  0.00    0.00%  0.0000       49.9% 
2    1,522       6.21  7.99    1.10  0.30    42.57%  0.3444       52.8% 
3    6,088       13.53  15.59    2.27  1.43    34.85%  0.2973       54.0% 
4    25,704       77.62  79.21    20.23  23.48    32.37%  0.2224       57.0% 
Specialization Quartile                             
1    5,397       10.27  17.51    0.00  0.02    0.00%  0.0009       49.9% 
2    3,610       64.81  67.56    10.75  14.05    15.92%  0.0737       56.1% 
3    14,783       83.81  87.37    21.03  27.21    25.11%  0.1315       56.7% 
4    14,918       41.15  55.09    12.46  15.98    45.61%  0.2948       53.3% 
 
Panel B: Correlations                
(N=38,708)          Industry   
          Experience   Experience   
Experience         1.0000     
Industry Experience      0.7998  1.0000   
Specialization        -0.1095  0.1994   
                       
Panel A shows the composition of the General Experience, Industry Experience and Specialization quartiles and mean values for selected characteristics of the 
quartiles.  Data are on a VC-company pair observation level.  Quartiles were composed at the beginning of each calendar year based on the values at the end of 
the previous year for each venture capital organization with investments in that year.  Industry experience and specialization quartiles were calculated by 
industry, so that industries with fewer investments would not be disproportionately sampled in lower quartiles.  The first quartile represents the least experienced 
or specialized, while the fourth is the highest.   
Panel B details the simple correlations between General Experience, Industry Experience and Specialization.  
Table 3: Impact of Public Market Signals 
 
                     Detrended    
         ' (1)     ' (2)     (3)     (4)    
                     
Lagged IPOs  0.2264        0.3508       
      [4.25]  ***    [6.08]  ***   
Lagged Q      0.4797        0.3617   
          [4.07]  ***    [2.25]  ** 
                     
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes    No    No   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes    No    No   
Detrended  No    No    Yes    Yes   
                     
Adj. R-squared  92.37%    92.30%    16.27%    2.59%   
                                
N     192     192     192     192    
 
The  sample  consists  of  yearly  observations  with  one  observation  per  industry  year  for  1975  to  1998, 
inclusive, excluding the industry all other.  The dependent variable is the is the log of the number of 
investments made by all venture organizations in industry g  in year t. Lagged IPOs is the log of the 
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of venture-backed companies in industry g in year t-1. Lagged Q 
is the market to book ratio of companies in SIC codes mapping to the Venture Source industry g  weighted 
by the number of public venture backed IPOs in that SIC code and equal weighted by companies within 
that  SIC  code  in  year  t-1.    Detrended  regressions  are  the  pooled  regressions  of  the  residuals  of  the 
dependent  and  independent  variables  regressed  against  year,  with  a  separate  regression  run  for  each 
industry. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 4:  Investment Patterns (No Interactions) 
         (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)    
PM Measure  IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     Q     Q    
                                 
PM Measure  0.0389    0.0392    0.0308    0.0371    0.0373    0.0297    0.0452   
      [12.88]  ***  [12.97]  ***  [11.09]  ***  [12.77]  ***  [12.86]  ***  [3.81]  ***  [5.57]  *** 
Experience       0.1271            0.1288        0.1288   
          [16.53]  ***         [17.14]  ***     [17.13]  *** 
Industry Experience           0.2029            0.2031       
              [29.80]  ***        [29.81]  ***    
Non-Industry Experience         -0.0051            -0.0053       
              [0.97]             [1.01]         
Specialization               0.8661    0.8792        0.8799   
                  [22.75]  ***  [23.47]  ***     [23.44]  *** 
Fixed Effects:  Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry   
      Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year   
Adj. R-squared  14.87%    20.62%    27.85%    20.23%    26.14%    27.78%    26.05%   
N     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874    
 The sample consists of aggregated investments by industry by year for 1,775 VCs in 8 industries from 1975 to 1998, inclusive, as compiled by Venture 
Economics.  Observations includes VC organization–years only for years after which the organization has been observed making an investment, and cease in the 
year after which the final investment is made. It excludes observations for years before VCs has made 5 investments and excludes VCs who invest in only one 
year of the sample.  
The dependent variable is the log of the number of investments made by venture organization f in industry g  in year t. The public market measure (PM Measure) 
is either Lagged IPOs, the log of the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of venture-backed companies in industry g in year t-1  or Lagged Q, the market to 
book ratio of companies in SIC codes mapping to the Venture Source industry g  weighted by the number of public venture backed IPOs in that SIC code and 
equal weighted by companies within that SIC code in year t-1. Experiencet is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture 
capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t.  Industry Experiencet is the 
difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industry g prior to year t and the average in year t of the 
number of investments made by all organizations in industry g prior to year y. Non-Industry Experience is the difference between the log of the number of 
investments made by venture capital organization f in industries other than g (~g) prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by 
all organizations in all industries other than g (~g)  prior to year t.  Specializationt is the difference between the number of investments made by venture capital 
organization f in industry g divided by the number of investments made by the venture organization in total prior to year t and the average of the same figure for 
all organizations in year t.   Industry and year fixed effects are including. T-statistics in italics below coefficient estimates are based on robust errors allowing for 
data clustering by venture capital organization.   
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 5:  Investment Patterns (Includes Interactions of IPOs)  
         (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)    
PM Measure     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     Q     Q    
                                     
PM Measure    -0.0424    0.0112    -0.0062    0.0203    0.0380    -0.0433    0.0053    0.0134   
      [6.56]  ***  [4.14]  ***  [0.88]     [3.87]  ***  [12.89]  ***  [7.07]  ***  [0.68]     [1.65]  * 
Experience     -0.0275                    -0.0259        -0.0001   
      [2.94]  ***                   [2.93]  ***     [0.01]    
Industry Experience       0.0413        0.0319            0.0338       
          [3.75]  ***     [2.90]  ***        [3.12]  ***   
Non-Industry Experience           0.0023    0.0182            0.0066       
              [0.25]     [2.49]  **          [1.13]        
Specialization                     0.3784    0.3911        0.3890   
                       [4.02]  ***  [4.47]  ***     [4.50]  *** 
Experience  * PM Measure  0.0604                    0.0603        0.0502   
      [12.18]  ***                [12.93]  ***    [14.01]  *** 
Industry Experience  * PM 
Measure      0.0541        0.0583            0.0574       
          [12.17]  ***    [13.63]  ***        [13.54]  ***   
Non-Industry Experience  * PM 
Measure          0.0348    -0.0080            -0.0035       
              [6.51]  ***  [2.15]  **          [1.24]        
Specialization  * PM Measure                  0.1529    0.1522  ***    0.1526  *** 
                      [5.10]  ***  [5.63]        [5.69]   
                                     
Controls:    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry   
      Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year   
                                     
Adj. R-
squared    22.16%    28.74%    18.66%    28.76%    20.35%    27.77%    28.73%    27.65%   
                                                        
N     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     71,874     
The sample consists of aggregated investments by industry by year for 1,775 VCs in 8 industries from 1975 to 1998, inclusive, as compiled by Venture 
Economics.  Observations includes VC organization–years only for years after which the organization has been observed making an investment, and cease in the 
year after which the final investment is made. It excludes observations for years before VCs has made 5 investments and excludes VCs who invest in only one 
year of the sample.   The dependent variable is the log of the number of investments made by venture organization f in industry g in year t. The public market 
measure (PM Measure) is either Lagged IPOs, the log of the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of venture-backed companies in industry g in year t-1  or 
Lagged Q, the market to book ratio of companies in SIC codes mapping to the Venture Source industry g  weighted by the number of public venture backed IPOs 
in that SIC code and equal weighted by companies within that SIC code in year t-1.  Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments 
made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Industry 
Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industry g prior to year t and the average in 
year t of the number of investments made by all organizations in industry g prior to year t. Non Industry Experience is the difference between the log of the 
number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industries other than g (~g) prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments 
made by all organizations in all industries other than g (~g)  prior to year t.  Specialization is the difference between the number of investments made by venture 
capital organization f in industry g divided by the number of investments made by the venture organization in total prior to year t and the average of the same 
figure for all organizations in year t.  Controls include industry and year fixed effects.  T-statistics in italics below coefficient estimates are based on robust 
standard errors allowing for data clustering by venture capital organization.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 6: Investment Patterns for Organizations That Made Investments In that Industry In that Year 
 
         (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)    
PM Measure     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     Q     Q    
                                     
PM Measure    0.0226    0.0446    0.0651    0.0571    0.0785    0.0062    0.1005    0.1026   
      [1.91]  *  [6.37]  ***  [5.42]  ***  [5.71]  ***  [10.85]  ***  [0.56]     [8.10]  ***  [7.66]  *** 
Experience     0.0150                    0.0126        0.0241   
      [0.85]                        [0.72]          [1.74]  * 
Industry Experience       0.0603        0.0519            0.0600       
          [3.23]  ***     [3.01]  ***        [3.56]  ***   
Non-Industry Experience           0.0379    0.0181            -0.0053       
              [2.15]  **  [1.24]             [0.43]        
Specialization                     0.4627    0.4810        0.5232   
                       [3.76]  ***  [4.20]  ***     [4.52]  *** 
Experience  * PM Measure  0.0357                    0.0409        0.0371   
      [5.54]  ***                [6.50]  ***    [8.08]  *** 
Industry Experience  * PM 
Measure      0.0342        0.0404            0.0374       
          [5.61]  ***    [7.17]  ***        [6.83]  ***   
Non-Industry Experience  * 
PM Measure          0.0138    -0.0114            -0.0035       
              [2.14]  **  [2.33]  **          [0.90]        
Specialization  * PM Measure                  0.0222    0.0489        0.0354   
                      [0.60]     [1.43]         [1.04]    
                                     
Fixed Effects:    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry   
      Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year   
                                     
Adj. R-
squared    20.63%    26.57%    16.95%    26.71%    17.14%    25.75%    26.81%    26.03%   
                                                        
N     14,768     14,768     14,768     14,768     14,768     14,768     14,768     14,768    
  
 
The sample consists of aggregated investments by industry by year for 1,775 VCs in 8 industries from 1975 to 1998, inclusive, as compiled by Venture 
Economics.  Observations include VC organization–years only for  years in  which the organization  has  made an investment in that industry.  It excludes 
observations for years before VCs has made 5 investments and excludes VCs who invest in only one year of the sample. The dependent variable is the log of the 
number of investments made by venture organization f in industry g in year t. The public market measure (PM Measure) is either Lagged IPOs, the log of the 
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of venture-backed companies in industry g in year t-1  or Lagged Q, the market to book ratio of companies in SIC codes 
mapping to the Venture Source industry g  weighted by the number of public venture backed IPOs in that SIC code and equal weighted by companies within that 
SIC code in year t-1. Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the 
average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Industry Experience is the difference between the log of the number of 
investments made by venture capital organization f in industry g prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations 
in industry g prior to year t. Non Industry Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in 
industries other than g (~g) prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations in all industries other than g (~g)  
prior to year t.  Specialization is the difference between the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industry g divided by the number of 
investments made by the venture organization in total prior to year t and the average of the same figure for all organizations in year t.  Controls include industry 
and year fixed effects.  T-statistics in italics below coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors allowing for data clustering by venture capital 
organization.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
 Table 7:  Success 
         (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)    
PM Measure     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     Q     Q    
                                         
PM Measure    -0.0054    -0.0142    -0.0143    -0.0158    -0.0159    -0.0153    -0.0160    -0.0260    -0.0239   
      [0.54]     [1.22]     [1.23]     [1.36]     [1.36]     [1.30]     [1.35]    [1.32]     [1.20]   
Experience             0.0145                0.0185        0.0186   
                [8.02]  ***              [8.62]  ***     [8.63]  *** 
Industry 
Experience               0.0210    0.0215            0.0215       
                   [8.84]  ***  [5.73]  ***        [5.72]  ***   
Non-Industry 
Experience                   -0.0005                   
                      [0.20]                    
Specialization                         0.0273    0.0502        0.0500   
                           [2.22]  **  [3.92]  ***     [3.90]  *** 
                                         
Fixed Effects:    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry   
      Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage   
      Round    Round    Round    Round    Round    Round    Round    Round    Round   
      Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year   
                                         
Adj. R-
squared    7.47%    9.39%    9.57%    9.63%    9.63%    9.00%    9.53%    9.63%    9.53%   
                                                              
N     15,518     41,406     41,406     41,406     41,406     38,708     38,708     41,406     38,708    
 
 
The sample consists of outcomes for investments made by 2,988 VCs in 15,518 companies from 1975 to 1998, inclusive, as compiled by Venture Economics.  
The first specification includes only one observation per company.  The remainder of the specifications includes one observation per unique VC-company pair. 
The dependent variable is Success a binary variable =1 if the portfolio company was acquired, merged, in registration for an IPO (as of the date we collected the 
Venture Economics data), or went public, and =0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the log of the number of investments made by venture organization f in 
industry g in year t. The public market measure (PM Measure) is either Lagged IPOs, the log of the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of venture-backed 
companies in industry g in year t-1 or Lagged Q, the market to book ratio of companies in SIC codes mapping to the Venture Source industry g weighted by the 
number of public venture backed IPOs in that SIC code and equal weighted by companies within that SIC code in year t-1. Experience is the difference between  
the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all 
organizations prior to year t. Industry Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in 
industry g prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations in industry g prior to year t. Non Industry Experience 
is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industries other than g (~g) prior to year t and the 
average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations in all industries other than g (~g)  prior to year t.  Specialization is the difference 
between the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industry g divided by the number of investments made by the venture organization 
in total prior to year t and the average of the same figure for all organizations in year t.  Controls include industry and year fixed effects.  T-statistics in italics 
below coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors allowing for data clustering by venture capital organization.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 8:  Success (Includes Interactions) 
 
         (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)    
PM Measure     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     IPOs     Q     Q    
                                 
PM Measure    -0.0174    -0.0197    -0.0187    -0.0168    -0.0270    -0.0311    -0.0298   
      [1.46]     [1.64]     [1.55]     [1.41]     [2.16]  **  [1.56]     [1.48]    
Experience     0.0064                -0.0004        0.0062   
      [1.03]                    [0.05]          [0.83]    
Industry Experience       0.0060    -0.0085            -0.0086       
          [0.59]     [0.61]             [0.62]        
Non-Industry Experience           0.0150            0.0172       
              [1.76]  *          [2.00]  **     
Specialization                 -0.0352    -0.0418        -0.0244   
                  [0.61]     [0.71]         [0.42]    
Experience  * PM Measure  0.0026                0.0059        0.0039   
      [1.36]                 [2.62]  ***    [1.74]  * 
Industry Experience  * PM Measure      0.0045    0.0094            0.0095       
          [1.52]     [2.27]  **          [2.33]  **     
Non-Industry Experience  * PM 
Measure          -0.0052            -0.0059       
              [1.95]  *          [2.20]  **     
Specialization  * PM Measure              0.0187    0.0279        0.0224   
                  [1.14]     [1.65]  *      [1.33]    
                                 
Controls:    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry    Industry   
      Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage    Stage   
      Round    Round    Round    Round    Round    Round    Round   
      Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year    Year   
                                 
Adj. R-squared  9.58%    9.64%    9.65%    9.32%    9.56%    9.65%    9.54%   
                                                  
N     41,406     41,406     41,406     38,708     38,708     41,406     38,708     
The sample consists of outcomes for investments made by 2,988 VCs in 15,518 companies from 1975 to 1998, inclusive, as compiled by Venture Economics.  
The first specification includes only one observation per company.  The remainder of the specifications includes one observation per unique VC-company pair.  
The dependent variable is Success a binary variable =1 if the portfolio company was acquired, merged, in registration for an IPO (as of the date we collected the 
Venture Economics data), or went public, and =0 otherwise. The public market measure (PM Measure) is either Lagged IPOs, the log of the number of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) of venture-backed companies in industry g in year t-1 or Lagged Q, the market to book ratio of companies in SIC codes mapping to the 
Venture Source industry g weighted by the number of public venture backed IPOs in that SIC code and equal weighted by companies within that SIC code in 
year t-1. Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t 
of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Industry Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments made 
by venture capital organization f in industry g prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations in industry g prior 
to year t. Non Industry Experience is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industries other than 
g (~g) prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations in all industries other than g (~g)  prior to year t.  
Specialization is the difference between the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industry g divided by the number of investments 
made by the venture organization in total prior to year t and the average of the same figure for all organizations in year t.  Controls include industry and year 
fixed effects.  T-statistics in italics below coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors allowing for data clustering by venture capital organization.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 9:  Robustness Checks 
                                               
            (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)    
Ever Invested in That Industry In the Past                       
N        46,650                       
Experience  * Lagged IPOs    0.0568                    0.0676   
        [9.14]  ***                [11.32]  *** 
Industry Experience  * Lagged IPOs      0.0992        0.1110           
            [14.52]  ***    [16.92]  ***       
Non-Industry Experience  * Lagged IPOs          0.0308    -0.0196           
                [4.94]  ***  [4.19]  ***       
Specialization  * Lagged IPOs                    0.3698    0.3652   
                        [11.04]  ***  [11.07]  *** 
Ever Invested in That Industry In the Sample                       
N        53,594                       
Experience  * Lagged IPOs    0.0563                    0.0596   
        [9.73]  ***                [10.86]  *** 
Industry Experience  * Lagged IPOs      0.0618        0.0653           
            [11.31]  ***    [12.49]           
Non-Industry Experience  * Lagged IPOs          0.0326    -0.0072           
                [5.49]  ***  [1.65]  *         
Specialization  * Lagged IPOs                    0.2206    0.2026   
                        [7.36]  ***  [7.09]  *** 
                                               
The sample varies to include only venture capital firms who have ever invested in the industry in the past or 
have ever made an investment in that industry in the sample (past or future).  It excludes observations for 
years before VCs has made 5 investments and excludes VCs who invest in only one year of the sample. 
The dependent variable is the log of the number of investments made by venture organization f in industry 
g in year t. The public market measure (PM Measure) is Lagged IPOs, the log of the number of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) of venture-backed companies in industry g in year t-1. Experience is the difference 
between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the 
average  in  year  t  of  the  number  of  investments  made  by  all  organizations  prior  to  year  t.  Industry 
Experience  is  the  difference  between  the  log  of  the  number  of  investments  made  by  venture  capital 
organization f in industry g prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by 
all organizations in industry g prior to year t. Non Industry Experience is the difference between the log of 
the number of investments made by venture capital organization f in industries other than g (~g) prior to 
year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations in all industries 
other than g (~g)  prior to year t.  Specialization is the difference between the number of investments made 
by venture capital organization f in industry g divided by the number of investments made by the venture 
organization in total prior to year t and the average of the same figure for all organizations in year t.  
Controls include industry and year fixed effects.  T-statistics in italics below coefficient estimates are based 
on robust standard errors allowing for data clustering by venture capital organization.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 